Services Acquisition in the DoD:  A Comparison of Management Practices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force by Rendon, Rene G. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2012-01
Services Acquisition in the DoD:  A
Comparison of Management Practices
in the Army, Navy, and Air Force
Rendon, Rene G.
þÿ A R J ,   J a n u a r y   2 0 1 2 ,   V o l .   1 9   N o .   1   :   0 0 3      0 3 2
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38776
A Publication of the Defense Acquisition University http://www.dau.mil
3 ARJ, January 2012, Vol. 19 No. 1 : 003 — 032 image designed by Diane Fleischer  »
Keywords: Services Acquisition, Services Contracting, 
Service Life Cycle, Contract Management, Project 
Management
Services Acquisition  
in the DoD: 
A Comparison of Management 
Practices in the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force
Rene G. Rendon, Uday M. Apte, and Aruna Apte
This article presents the results of empirical studies of 
current practices in services acquisition in the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force. The authors studied the manage-
ment practices in areas such as contract characteristics, 
acquisition management methods, use of the project 
management approach, acquisition leadership, and 
ownership of requirements. They also studied areas such 
as the ability of personnel responsible for acquisition, 
adequacy of acquisition billets and their fill rates, and 
training provided to services acquisition personnel. The 
data confirmed that the Navy uses a regional contracting 
approach, while the Army and the Air Force use an 
installation-level approach. These differences have 
important implications for other acquisition manage-
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The service sector represents the largest and fastest growing 
segment of the economies of the United States and other developed 
countries. In the United States, services accounted for well over 85 per-
cent of employment in the year 2007 (Apte, Nath, & Karmarkar, 2011). 
This growth of services in the overall economy has been mirrored by the 
growth of services acquisition in private-sector companies (Smeltzer 
& Ogden, 2002) and in the government. For example, as seen in Figure 
1, the procurement of services in the DoD has continued to increase in 
scope and dollars in the past decade. Even considering the high value of 
weapon systems and military equipment purchased in recent years, the 
DoD has spent more on services than on supplies, equipment, and sys-
tems together (Camm, Blickstein, & Venzor, 2004). Specifically, the DoD 
obligations on contracts have more than doubled between fiscal years 
2001 and 2008—to over $387 billion, with over $200 billion spent just 
for services (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2009a). 
FIGURE 1. DoD’S CONTRACTS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES 
(2000–2009) 
Note. Adapted from “Defense Contract Trends: u.s. Department of Defense Contract 
spending and supporting industrial Base,” by J. R. ellman, D. liverood, D. Morrow, and 
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As the DoD’s services procurement continues to increase in scope 
and dollars, the DoD must give greater attention to the management of 
services contracts. However, the increase in services contracting has 
coincided with a reduction in the Defense Acquisition Workforce. The 
Defense Acquisition Workforce fell from approximately 500,000 person-
nel in 1990, to approximately 200,000 personnel in 2006—a decrease of 
approximately 65 percent. For the U.S. Army, from 1995 to 2006 acqui-
sition dollars increased by 382 percent, acquisition actions increased 
by 359 percent, yet the acquisition workforce decreased by 53 percent 
(Gansler, 2011, p. 237).
This mismatch between the increasing workload and the decreasing 
size of the workforce, and the unique nature and complexities associated 
with services acquisition, has possibly created an environment wherein 
following the best practices has not always been feasible. Between 2001 
and 2009, the GAO issued 16 reports related to trends, challenges, and 
deficiencies in contracting for services. In addition, between 2002 and 
2008 the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) issued 142 reports on deficien-
cies noted in the DoD acquisition and contract administration process. 
A summary discussion of these deficiencies is provided in the Appendix.
The characteristics of service production differ from manufactur-
ing production in several ways. The key differentiating characteristics 
of services discussed in textbooks (Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2006; 
Metters, King-Metters, & Pullman, 2003) include the intangibility of ser-
vice output, co-production, simultaneity of production and consumption, 
the inability to store services, and the complexity in the definition and 
measurement of services. The differences in the production of services 
as opposed to that of manufactured products give rise to an important 
question: Is the acquisition of services essentially the same as acquisi-
tion of products? If differences exist, then what are they, and what do 
they imply for the contracting of services? Given the growth in size and 
scope of services acquisition in today’s economy, these questions are 
undoubtedly important. 
This article analyzes and compares primary data collected by 
researchers from completed surveys involving the Departments of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force; and draws conclusions on how services 
acquisition is managed within and across the departments. The analysis 
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of survey results will focus on the following areas: contract characteris-
tics, acquisition management methods, project-team approach, services 
acquisition leadership, and other management issues. 
The article is organized into four sections. In the next section, we 
describe the empirical studies we conducted, including the survey 
research methodology we used in the study. We provide the results of the 
survey data analysis and some salient observations in the third section. 
The findings and conclusions of the study and our recommendations for 
improving services acquisition and for future research are presented in 
the fourth section.
Research Methodology and  
the Empirical Studies
The methodology used in this research consisted of a survey instru-
ment specifically developed to address the research objectives and 
questions mentioned in the Introduction section. This was a Web-based 
survey instrument developed using the SurveyMonkey™ software. The 
developed survey instrument (provided in Compton & Meinshausen, 
2007) was first piloted for its validity and was fine-tuned prior to its use 
in this research.
The Web-based survey was conducted in all three military depart-
ments. The following discussion summarizes these survey-based 
empirical studies.
Army
The standardized survey was deployed to 81 contracting offices. The 
survey was distributed across 8 major contracting centers throughout 
the Army, including 40 Army installations. We received a total of 61 
responses to the survey, with a survey response rate of 75 percent.
Navy
Since the Navy mostly follows a regional approach in its acquisi-
tion of goods and services, we deployed the survey to 6 Navy regional 
contracting centers and received inputs from all 6 regions, covering 66 
Navy installations. In addition, we requested and received responses 
from Naval Supply and Naval Medical Logistics Command. Thus, our 
response rate for the Navy survey was 100 percent.
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Air Force
The survey instrument was deployed to 50 Air Force Contracting 
Squadrons, representing 6 Air Force major commands. There were 34 
responses from the survey, resulting in a 68 percent response rate. These 
responses represented all 6 Air Force major commands.
The survey began with questions that focused on specific demo-
graphic data, followed by specific questions related to the approach, 
method, and procedures used in the acquisition of services for specific 
categories of services. The categories of services targeted in this research 
were (a) professional, administrative, and management support; (b) 
maintenance and repair of equipment; (c) data processing and telecom-
munications; (d) utilities and housekeeping; and (e) transportation and 
travel. These categories were selected because collectively they represent 
a significant percentage of spending for all the services, and are com-
monly acquired in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The survey instrument included core questions related to the meth-
ods and procedures used in the acquisition of services for the service 
categories mentioned in the preceding paragraph. These core questions 
focused on the following areas:
Contract Characteristics
The purpose of this category of questions was to gain insight into the 
dominant procurement methods and contract types used in the acquisi-
tion of services. The contract characteristics examined in this section 
were degree of competition (competitively bid or sole source), contract 
type (fixed price or cost type), and type of contract incentive (incentive 
fee, award fee, or award term). 
Acquisition Management Methods
The purpose of this broad category of questions was to understand 
the management methods and approaches used in the acquisition of 
individual services at each phase of the contract management process. 
For each of the contract management phases, the survey questioned 
whether the phase was conducted at a regional, installation, or some 
other organizational level. This core question category also focused on 
whether a project-team approach was typically used in the acquisition 
of the respective service category. The questions explored the position of 
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the services acquisition project team leader, such as a program/project 
manager or contracting officer. The questions also explored information 
on the owner of the requirement for the service being acquired.
Other Program Management Issues
This last category of core questions focused on the use of a life-cycle 
approach, the length of assignments for services acquisition manage-
ment personnel, the use of market research techniques, the level of 
staffing in services acquisition management, and the level of training 
of services acquisition management personnel. These questions offered 
respondents a Likert-type scale to measure the level of agreement or 
disagreement among the respondents’ statements.
Analysis and Comparison  
of Survey Data
In this section, we present the results of our analysis of survey data 
(Appendix) concerning the acquisition management practices in the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force, arranged into the data categories described 
in the Research Methodology and the Empirical Studies section.
Contract Characteristics
We discuss three aspects of contract characteristics: degree of com-
petition, type of contract, and contract incentives. It should be noted that 
the Navy and the Air Force surveys were conducted in 2008, while the 
Army survey was conducted in 2009. Consequently, the Army survey 
results contain data for 2008, while the data streams for the Navy and 
the Air Force surveys end in 2007. We used the contract characteristic 
data for 2007 and computed averages across services and acquisition 
phases to obtain measures of contract characteristics. The comparison 
of contract characteristics for the Army, Navy, and Air Force is depicted 
in Figure 2. 
Degree of competition. Providing for full and open competition 
is a public policy and statutory requirement in government contracting. 
Unless the government can justify an exception to the competition 
requirements, the procurement must provide for full and open 
competition in the solicitation and award of the contract. In addition to 
supporting accountability and transparency in government contracts, 
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the services acquisition project team leader, such as a program/project 
manager or contracting officer. The questions also explored information 
on the owner of the requirement for the service being acquired.
Other Program Management Issues
This last category of core questions focused on the use of a life-cycle 
approach, the length of assignments for services acquisition manage-
ment personnel, the use of market research techniques, the level of 
staffing in services acquisition management, and the level of training 
of services acquisition management personnel. These questions offered 
respondents a Likert-type scale to measure the level of agreement or 
disagreement among the respondents’ statements.
Analysis and Comparison  
of Survey Data
In this section, we present the results of our analysis of survey data 
(Appendix) concerning the acquisition management practices in the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force, arranged into the data categories described 
in the Research Methodology and the Empirical Studies section.
Contract Characteristics
We discuss three aspects of contract characteristics: degree of com-
petition, type of contract, and contract incentives. It should be noted that 
the Navy and the Air Force surveys were conducted in 2008, while the 
Army survey was conducted in 2009. Consequently, the Army survey 
results contain data for 2008, while the data streams for the Navy and 
the Air Force surveys end in 2007. We used the contract characteristic 
data for 2007 and computed averages across services and acquisition 
phases to obtain measures of contract characteristics. The comparison 
of contract characteristics for the Army, Navy, and Air Force is depicted 
in Figure 2. 
Degree of competition. Providing for full and open competition 
is a public policy and statutory requirement in government contracting. 
Unless the government can justify an exception to the competition 
requirements, the procurement must provide for full and open 
competition in the solicitation and award of the contract. In addition to 
supporting accountability and transparency in government contracts, 
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competitive procurements also result in competitively priced proposals 
that increase the government’s ability to negotiate a fair and reasonable 
contract price.
As we note at the top of Figure 2, the predominant procurement 
approach used in the services we studied was full and open competition. 
Since these services—administrative, maintenance, data processing, 
utilities/housekeeping, and transportation services—are traditional and 
commercial in nature, a valid assumption is that the competitive market-
place should be capable of proposing and competing for these contracts. 
However, we also note that a small but notable portion of contracts for 
Navy and Army were sole sourced. We do not have detailed data on these 
sole-sourced contracts, but perhaps the services acquired were context-
specific and unique in nature.
Contract type. The Federal Acquisition Regulation categorizes the 
major contract types as fixed-price and cost reimbursement. Fixed-price 
contracts are appropriate for well-defined requirements in situations with 
a low performance risk. On the other hand, under cost-reimbursement 
contracts, which are appropriate for developmental requirements, the 
performance risk is high. Given the commercial and low-risk nature 
of the services being studied, firm-fixed price contracts would be the 
appropriate contractual instrument for these service projects. We note 
in the center of Figure 2 that, as expected, a significant majority of the 
contracts were fixed price.
Contract incentive. In some situations, the government may 
want to subjectively incentivize the contractor to meet higher levels of 
performance and go beyond the basic requirements of the contract. In 
these situations, award-fee or award-term contract incentives may be 
used. Since commercial services are usually well understood and the 
output or outcome can be reasonably well defined, less contract incentives 
may be needed. This observation is reflected at the bottom of Figure 2.
Acquisition Management Methods
In this section, we provide a comparison of Army, Navy, and Air 
Force practices in two areas: the organization level at which services are 
acquired and the use of a project-team approach. The comparison is 
shown in Figure 3. 
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Organizational level at which services are acquired. The 
military departments procure services and manage services acquisition 
at the installation level or regional level. The proximity of locations 
where the acquisition contracts are managed and where the services are 
actually performed may have an impact on the effectiveness of the project 
management, as well as the success of the services projects. Services 
performed at one location, with the contract and overall project managed 
at a distant location, may result in less-than-adequate management 
and control of the project as well as less-than-proper surveillance of 
the service contractor. Insufficient control of the project and less-than-
adequate surveillance of the service contractor increase the risk to the 
DoD of not receiving the full value of its service procurement dollars.
However, in general, it is not possible to say if acquiring services using 
one specific approach—regional-level or installation-level—is necessarily 
better than the other approach. The regional approach (centralized pro-
curement) can give rise to economies of scale, uniformity of procedures, 
and the possibility of consistently using best acquisition practices. On the 
other hand, installation-level acquisition (decentralized procurement) 
allows for easier implementation of project management and program 
competitive procurements also result in competitively priced proposals 
that increase the government’s ability to negotiate a fair and reasonable 
contract price.
As we note at the top of Figure 2, the predominant procurement 
approach used in the services we studied was full and open competition. 
Since these services—administrative, maintenance, data processing, 
utilities/housekeeping, and transportation services—are traditional and 
commercial in nature, a valid assumption is that the competitive market-
place should be capable of proposing and competing for these contracts. 
However, we also note that a small but notable portion of contracts for 
Navy and Army were sole sourced. We do not have detailed data on these 
sole-sourced contracts, but perhaps the services acquired were context-
specific and unique in nature.
Contract type. The Federal Acquisition Regulation categorizes the 
major contract types as fixed-price and cost reimbursement. Fixed-price 
contracts are appropriate for well-defined requirements in situations with 
a low performance risk. On the other hand, under cost-reimbursement 
contracts, which are appropriate for developmental requirements, the 
performance risk is high. Given the commercial and low-risk nature 
of the services being studied, firm-fixed price contracts would be the 
appropriate contractual instrument for these service projects. We note 
in the center of Figure 2 that, as expected, a significant majority of the 
contracts were fixed price.
Contract incentive. In some situations, the government may 
want to subjectively incentivize the contractor to meet higher levels of 
performance and go beyond the basic requirements of the contract. In 
these situations, award-fee or award-term contract incentives may be 
used. Since commercial services are usually well understood and the 
output or outcome can be reasonably well defined, less contract incentives 
may be needed. This observation is reflected at the bottom of Figure 2.
Acquisition Management Methods
In this section, we provide a comparison of Army, Navy, and Air 
Force practices in two areas: the organization level at which services are 
acquired and the use of a project-team approach. The comparison is 
shown in Figure 3. 
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management approaches, including accurate requirements definition and 
proper contractor surveillance. Under either approach, however, a key to 
success is adopting suitable management practices.
We note in the top row of Figure 3 that services acquisition in 
the Navy takes place predominantly at the regional level, whereas 
services acquisition in the Army and the Air Force occurs predominantly 
at the installation level. As we discuss later in this section and the 
next, this difference in approaches has a significant inf luence on 
effectiveness of various management practices such as the use of the 
project-team approach and the position of the person who provides the 
contractor surveillance.
Project-team approach. Services acquisition, such as 
information technology services or aircraft maintenance services, 
is typically technically complex and requires support from various 
functional areas such as engineering, procurement, finance, and logistics. 
Best practices in project and contract management reflect the use of 
project teams—specifically cross-functional teams—in the management 
of services projects. The use of project teams facilitates the proper 
integration and control of the various functional disciplines involved 
in the project effort. Insufficient control and functional integration of 
project activities increase the risk of not achieving the project’s cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives.
We note in the bottom row of Figure 3 that the Army and Air Force 
use the project-team approach more frequently than the Navy, which 
uses it slightly more than 50 percent of the time. A plausible explana-
tion is that, in general, when services are acquired at the installation 
level, the physical proximity of personnel can make it easier to establish 
and use project teams in managing the acquisition. Thus, the use of the 
regional approach by the Navy means that it has less opportunity to use 
project teams. Perhaps a virtual-team approach may need to be adopted 
by the Navy. 
Acquisition leadership. In addition to the use of project teams, 
another best practice is formally designating a trained project manager 
with the authority to lead the project effort. The project manager is 
typically a coordinator and integrator of the various functional 
disciplines involved in the project and has overall responsibility for the 
project’s success. The project manager is focused on the overall objectives 
Services Acquisition in the DoD: A Comparison of Management Practices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force
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of the project, and on integrating and balancing the interests of the 
various functional disciplines (engineering, procurement, finance, and 
logistics) involved in the services project. Figure 4 provides answers to 
the question: Who leads the services acquisition project—a contracting 
officer (CO) or quality assurance evaluator (QAE)/contracting officer 
representative (COR)? The top row of Figure 4 shows that when a project 
team is used, the CO predominantly leads the services acquisition project 
in the Army and Air Force and leads it only slightly more than half of the 
time in the Navy. The bottom row of Figure 4 also shows that when a 
project team is not used, the CO predominantly leads the services 
acquisition project in the Air Force and Navy and leads it only slightly 
less than half of the time in the Army.
Requirement ownership. Services acquisition includes 
managing the requirement. The requirement is the specific service that is 
being procured—for example, information technology services or aircraft 
maintenance services. Notably, the contract management process and, 
more specifically, the authorities and responsibilities of the CO, do not 
include requirements management activities (such as determining the 
requirement, modifying the requirement, assessing the effectiveness of 
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the requirement, or terminating the need for the requirement). These 
requirements management authorities and activities belong to the 
requirements manager of the organization responsible for the service 
being procured. Once the requirements organization identifies, develops, 
and defines the requirement, the contracting organization performs the 
contracting activities to procure the needed service. COs, however, may 
support the development of the requirements documents by providing 
business and procurement expertise in this area. For example, an 
aircraft maintenance squadron would own the aircraft maintenance 
service requirement being procured by the contracting organization 
for that specific installation. Figure 5 provides data on who owns the 
requirements—the CO or QAE/COR. 
In general, the practice of having a CO lead the acquisition or own 
the requirements is not appropriate, regardless of whether a project-team 
approach is used. What is surprising from the survey data shown in Fig-
ure 4 is that the project teams are frequently led by the CO as opposed 
to being led by a formally designated project manager responsible for 
the overall service project’s success. We consider this finding surpris-
ing since the CO is a functional specialist concerned with ensuring 
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that the contractor is in compliance with the government contracting 
rules, while a project manager is concerned with the overall success of 
the project, in terms of cost, schedule, and performance objectives. In 
addition, a project manager typically represents the service requirement 
owner and is typically responsible for making technical changes to the 
requirement during contract performance. This does not mean that the 
project manager can make changes to the contract. Only authorized COs 
can make changes to the contract. However, COs should not be making 
technical changes to the service requirement and, traditionally, do not 
have the expertise or technical knowledge to make such changes (for 
example, making technical changes to the requirements for aircraft 
maintenance service). The role of leading project teams involves man-
aging the requirement and authorizing related technical changes to the 
requirement during contractor performance. We also observed the fol-
lowing in Figures 4 and 5: 
•	 As seen in Figure 4, for the Army and Air Force the use of 
a project team increased the probability of the CO leading 
the services acquisition.
•	 As seen in Figure 4, for the Navy, perhaps due to regional 
organization, the use of project teams decreased the prob-
ability of the CO leading the acquisition.
•	 The above two trends are also observed in Figure 5 for the 
requirements ownership.
Program Management Issues
The first set of program management issues we investigated was 
the scope and ability of personnel responsible for services acquisition. 
Figure 6 provides comparative data on this count. 
We note in the top row of Figure 6 that, as expected, the CO always 
writes and awards contracts in the Navy and the Air Force. In the Army, 
the CO only writes and awards the contracts in 97 percent of cases. It is 
unclear why this is the case. One should ask who else, besides the CO, is 
writing and awarding contracts. It should be noted that, in accordance 
with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, only duly warranted COs have 
the authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts. It is 
unclear why the Army data would reflect that the CO awards contracts 
less than 100 percent of the time. 
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FIGURE 6. SCOPE AND ABILITY OF PERSONNEL 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ACQUISITION 
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Another critical aspect of services acquisition is contractor surveil-
lance. Contractor surveillance ensures that the contractor’s performance 
complies with the requirements of the contract and, thus, the government 
is receiving the services procured. Due to the technical nature of many 
services contracts, contractor surveillance personnel should be knowl-
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edgeable about the technical aspects of the service and be ideally drawn 
from the technical community responsible for the service requirement. 
Thus, it is critical that surveillance personal have the requisite technical 
skills for conducting contractor surveillance.
We note in the middle row of Figure 6 that, as expected, in the Air 
Force and the Army, Q AE/CORs predominantly provide contractor 
surveillance. However, in the Navy, QAE/CORs provide contractor sur-
veillance in about 50 percent of the cases, with the CO shouldering that 
responsibility in the remaining cases. These results indicate another 
situation in which COs may be performing activities outside their area of 
expertise—in this case, performing contractor surveillance. Contractor 
surveillance involves technical knowledge and expertise in the service 
requirements area. A CO, considered a business advisor with expertise 
in government contracting rules and regulations, should not be per-
forming technical contractor surveillance on, for example, an aircraft 
maintenance service contract. Perhaps this is related to and caused by 
the regional approach to services acquisition being adopted by the Navy. 
Finally, we studied the length of time COR/Q AEs spend in their 
assigned position. The comparative data are presented in the bottom 
row of Figure 6. We note the following:
•	 The majority of COR/QAEs in the Air Force were assigned 
in the position for less than 3 years. Perhaps this is caused 
by significant turnover in staff.
•	 In the Navy, a significant percentage of COR/QAEs were in 
the job for more than 3 years. Interestingly, this seems to be 
the case in spite of the fact observed earlier that the CO is 
responsible for surveillance half of the time.
The final category of survey data consisted of other miscellaneous 
issues related to services acquisition program management. These 
include the use of the life-cycle approach in routine and nonroutine 
services, the adequacy of services acquisition billets, responsibility of 
various staff members, and the training given to these staff members. 
The comparative data are presented in Figures 7 and 8.
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Life-cycle approach. The use of a life cycle to manage and control 
the progress of a project is considered a best practice in project 
management (Rendon & Snider, 2008). The project life cycle allows the 
project to be managed in phases, with each phase controlled by gates and 
decision points. The use of a project life cycle should be a concern for 
ensuring proper management of service projects, especially nonroutine 
services. If the services being procured and managed are of a nonroutine 
nature, one would expect higher levels of uncertainty—and, thus, higher 
levels of cost, schedule, and performance risk—in the management of 
these service projects. Best practices in reducing project risk include the 
use of a project life cycle—with project phases, gates, and decision-points 
for monitoring and controlling the progression of the service project 
procurement process as well as the resulting service. Without the use of 
a project life cycle, the service project may be vulnerable to excessive 
risk in terms of meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives. This 
would especially be true in the procurement and management of high-
risk nonroutine services.The top row of Figure 7 reflects that, for routine 
services, a life cycle was predominantly used by the Air Force, and less 
so (approximately less than half of the time) by the Army and Navy. As 
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seen in the bottom row of Fig ure 7, a life-cycle approach was 
predominantly used for nonroutine services by the Navy, and less so 
(approximately less than half of the time) by the Army and Air Force. 
Service acquisition billets and responsibility of staff 
members. The management of services acquisition is the responsibility 
of the services’ acquisition personnel located at the regional or 
installation organizations. Each acquisition organization has designated 
acquisition positions, or billets, for its acquisition personnel. In addition, 
these positions may or may not be filled due to lack of personnel (perhaps 
personnel are deployed) or to the understaffing of organizations. These 
acquisition personnel are also required to receive the appropriate 
training ref lective of their assigned acquisition duties, such as CO, 
QAE, or COR. Thus, having an adequate number of acquisition billets in 
an organization is not sufficient. These billets must be adequately filled, 
and the personnel filling these acquisition billets must be adequately 
trained. Having an adequate number of filled acquisition billets, staffed 
with trained acquisition personnel, is integral to providing a proper level 
of oversight for monitoring contractor performance. Finally, having a 
proper level of oversight is critically important for successful services 
acquisition management. 
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The pie-charts in Figure 8 display the survey responses for these 
areas. The following are salient observations on the charts:
•	 The top row of Figure 8 shows that the Army and Air Force 
predominantly disagree that there is an adequate number 
of acquisition billets, while the Navy survey responses  
were inconclusive. 
•	 The second row of Figure 8 reveals that the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force all predominantly disagree that these acquisition 
billets are adequately filled.
•	 The third row of Figure 8 indicates that the Navy and Air 
Force predominantly agree that the services’ acquisition 
personnel are adequately trained, while the Army survey 
responses were inconclusive. 
•	 The bottom row of Figure 8 suggests that the Army pre-
dominantly disagrees that a proper level of oversight is 
afforded to monitor the contractor’s performance; the Air 
Force predominantly agrees that a proper level of oversight 
is afforded to monitor contractor performance; and the 
Navy survey responses were inconclusive. 
Recommendations
To improve the management of services acquisition, our first rec-
ommendation is to continue the use of fixed-price contracts, while also 
increasing the number of competitively awarded contracts. Fixed-price 
contracts promote competition, which ensures that the government gets 
the right services at the best value. Fixed-price contracts also shift the 
risk of cost overruns away from the government and onto the contrac-
tor. This also serves to incentivize the contractor to complete tasks 
within budget. Also included in this first recommendation is to increase 
emphasis on promoting full and open competition. However, it should 
be noted that the initiative promoted by the current Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics of decreasing service 
contracts’ total period of performance from 5 years (basic plus four 
options) to 3 years (basic plus two options) as an approach to increasing 
competition may also result in some unintended consequences. Increas-
ing the frequency of service contracts re-competition may result in 
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potential offerors deciding not to submit proposals for these shorter term 
contracts. In addition, the incumbent contractors on services contracts 
may be reluctant to implement continuous improvement programs given 
the shorter term contracts. Hence, instead of reducing contract periods 
of performance, another approach to increasing competition may be to 
take an in-depth look at the current justifications and approvals for not 
providing for full and open competition. 
Our second recommendation relates to the management of ser-
vices acquisition at the regional versus installation level. As previously 
discussed, each individual approach has advantages and disadvan-
tages. In our view, the key to success under either approach is to use 
the proper supporting project management processes such as require-
ments management, designating project managers and project teams 
with established roles and responsibilities, and ensuring sufficient COR 
surveillance of contractor performance. Consequently, we recommend 
that the Navy adopt a more disciplined and rigorous project management 
approach to its management of services acquisition, possibly including 
a virtual project management team. This team would consist of the 
project manager, requirements manager, and CO at the regional office. 
The QAE/COR would then serve as the site manager and be responsible 
for contractor surveillance. The QAE/COR would act as the “eyes and 
ears” of the regional project manager and CO, and would coordinate 
program and contracting issues back to the project manager. This might 
require QAEs/CORs who have higher level knowledge and skills due 
to their expanded roles and responsibilities. The Army and Air Force’s 
installation-level management of services acquisition should ensure 
consistency in services acquisition management processes department-
wide. Our recommendations include the establishment of dedicated 
installation project managers responsible for the overall cost, schedule, 
and performance requirements of the services acquisition. Additionally, 
the installation project teams should include a requirements manager 
or representative who is authorized to identify, manage, and change the 
services requirement and submit those technical changes to the CO for 
incorporating into the contract. Establishing a dedicated project man-
ager and adding a requirements manager/representative to the project 
team would relieve the CO from performing these conflicting roles. 
Our third recommendation to improve the overall management of 
services acquisition is to increase the fill-rate of current acquisition 
billets. Over 75 percent of the respondents disagreed that the acquisi-
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tion billets were adequately filled. Thus, the initial effort in increasing 
the Defense Acquisition Workforce should be to first fill the current 
acquisition billets throughout the DoD with trained and experienced 
personnel. Only then will the DoD be able to determine if additional 
acquisition billets are needed. Additionally, special emphasis should 
be placed on ensuring sufficient CORs/QAEs are assigned to oversee 
contractors’ performance. Ensuring the acquisition billets are filled 
with properly trained and experienced acquisition personnel will allow 
for better oversight and will help ensure that contractor performance is 
properly monitored. 
Our fourth recommendation is to increase the effectiveness and 
availability of training to ensure a qualified Defense Acquisition Work-
force. Based on the results from the research, a majority of the Army 
respondents, and almost half of the Air Force and Navy respondents, 
did not agree that the Defense Acquisition Workforce was adequately 
trained. Respondents also provided numerous negative comments 
regarding the poor quality of training and the lack of training. Our rec-
ommendation is not necessarily that additional training is needed, but 
that more appropriate training is needed. This needed training may be 
in the form of experiential or on-the-job training, and localized coach-
ing and mentoring in contracting procedures, as opposed to additional 
formal Defense Acquisition University classroom training. For example, 
current research by students enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School 
MBA Contract Management program has identified that a knowledge gap 
exists within the Air Force contracting workforce. Based on a limited 
empirical survey sample of the Air Force contracting workforce, this 
knowledge gap reflects that the Air Force contracting workforce receives 
more formalized classroom training on contracting activities that are 
less frequently performed, and less formal classroom training related to 
contracting activities that are performed more frequently. Additionally, 
and more importantly, if the COs are to continue acting as de-facto proj-
ect managers by leading the acquisition teams, then they should receive 
training on project management concepts, project control techniques, 
and project leadership. 
Finally, as discussed earlier, the researchers in the fields of opera-
tions management have studied and identified several key characteristics 
of services that lead to differences in the production of services as 
opposed to manufactured products. We believe that the same key charac-
teristics must also be taken into account in designing and managing the 
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processes involved in acquiring services. Given these considerations, we 
believe that significant opportunities exist to conduct research into the 
impact of these services’ characteristics (intangibility, co-production, 
simultaneity of production and consumption, inability to store services, 
and complexity in defining and measuring services) on the acquisition of 
different service types and the associated implications for the services 
acquisition management process.
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Appendix
TABLE 1.  DEFICIENCIES IN SERVICES CONTRACTING
•	 The government is required to conduct market research to 
determine the market’s capability for providing the required 
supply or services and the government’s appropriate contracting 
strategy for the procurement (Rendon & snider, 2008).  Reports 
have shown that the DoD has not conducted adequate market 
research during procurement planning of services contracts (GAo, 
2002a; DoD iG, 2009).  
•	 selecting the appropriate contract type is essential to ensuring the 
appropriate sharing and allocation of risk between the government 
and the contractor. Fixed-price contracts allocate the majority of 
the cost risk to the contractor, while cost-reimbursement contracts 
provide for most of the cost risk to be borne by the government. 
Government reports have shown that inappropriate contract 
types were used in services contracts, resulting in more risk to the 
government (GAo, 2001; DoD iG, 2009). 
•	 The use of project management tools and techniques, such as 
designated formal project managers, project teams, and project life 
cycles, have been considered a best practice in managing services 
contracts. GAo reports have shown that the DoD lacks the proper 
management structure and processes for managing services 
contracts (GAo, 2007b; DoD iG, 2009).   
•	 sufficient requirements management is essential for identification 
and development of needs for the DoD. if requirements management 
is insufficient, the resulting services contracts will not adequately 
meet the customer’s needs. The GAo and DoD iG reports have 
identified poorly defined requirements and insufficient requirements 
management as problems in services contracts (GAo, 2007b; DoD 
iG, 2009).
•	 Defense contract management requires specialized skills and 
competencies that come from extensive training and experience. 
A properly trained and competent Defense Acquisition Workforce 
is considered the heart of successful defense acquisition 
management. With the downsizing of the DoD workforce, the lack 
of a qualified acquisition and contracting workforce to manage the 
increased workload in DoD services contracts continues to plague 
DoD services contracting efforts (GAo, 2002b; 2009b).
•	 The essence of DoD contract management is the proper 
administration of contracts and oversight of contractor performance. 
The lack of effective contract administration and contractor oversight 
increases the government’s risk of not ensuring total value for the 
dollars spent on services contracts. The GAo and DoD iG reports 
have consistently identified contract administration and contractor 
oversight as problem areas in the management of services contracts 
(GAo, 2005; 2007a; 2007b; DoD iG, 2009).
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TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES  
IN THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE




CONTRACT CHARACTERISTICS (Figure 2)
Degree of Competition
Competitive 66 56 71
sole source 10 13 4
Not Applicable 24 28 25
Contract Type
Fixed Price 66 69 71
Cost Reimbursement 8 0 4
Not Applicable 26 31 25
Contract incentive
Yes 9 5 8
No 91 95 92
ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT METHODS (Figure 3)
organization level at Which services are Acquired
Regional 11 32 5
installation 66 24 70
No Response 23 44 25
use of Project-Team Approach
Yes 63 51 64
No 38 49 36
ACQUISITION LEADERSHIP (Figure 4)
When Project-Team Approach is used
Co 69 56 76
other 31 44 24
When Project-Team Approach is Not used
Co 47 65 61
other 53 35 39
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REQUIREMENTS OWNERSHIP (Figure 5)
When Project-Team Approach is used
Co 28 33 17
other 72 67 83
When Project-Team Approach is Not used
Co 22 24 10
other 78 76 90
SCOPE AND ABILITY OF PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE  
FOR ACQUISITION (Figure 6)
Who Writes and Awards Contracts?
Co 97 100 100
other 3 0 0
Who is Responsible for surveillance?
Co 13 38 9
QAe/CoR 51 38 91
other 36 25 0
How long Did the CoR/QAe spend in the Position?
more than 36 months 39 50 6
12-36 months 48 38 79
0-12 months 13 0 15
No Answer 0 12 0
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LIFE-CYCLE APPROACH (Figure 7)
Routine services
Disagree 34 0 26
Neutral 18 25 21
Agree 41 63 50
No Answer 7 12 3
Nonroutine services
Disagree 43 0 41
Neutral 25 38 26
Agree 21 50 29
No Answer 11 12 4
ACQUISITION BILLETS (Figure 8)
Number of Billets is Adequate
Disagree 74 38 59
Neutral 10 25 6
Agree 13 25 35
No Answer 3 12 0
Billets are Filled
Disagree 66 50 65
Neutral 13 13 9
Agree 17 25 26
No Answer 5 12 0
staff is Adequately Trained
Disagree 38 13 9
Neutral 20 25 21
Agree 39 50 71
No Answer 3 12 0
Proper level of oversight is Afforded to Monitor Contractor Performance
Disagree 57 38 15
Neutral 20 38 6
Agree 23 25 79
